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ABSTRACT
This paper provides evidence and an explanation for an empiricalregularity
in the income velocity of money. Based on a cross country comparison in
the post World War II period of 84 countries arrayed fromvery low to very
high per capita income, velocity displays a U shaped pattern. This observed
cross country pattern is very similar to one observed in an earlier study
by the authors for a number of advanced countries for over a century.
The U—shaped pattern of velocity behavior is explained by anapproach
which stresses the influence of institutional factors. On a secular basis
the downward trend in velocity is due to a process of monetization while
the upward trend is explained by financial development. On a crosscountry
basis industrialized countries with well developed financial systems should
generally display a rising trend in velocity while poor countries at an earlier
stage of economics growth should as a rule have falling trends. Velocity
in economies "in between" should exhibit a fairly flat pattern with a weak
positive or negative trend.
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I.Introduction
In this paper we provide evidence and an explanation foran empirical
regularity in the income velocity of money. Based on a crosscountry comparison
in the post World II period of 84 countriesarrayed from very low to very
high per capita income, velocity displays a U shaped pattern. This observed
cross country pattern is very similar to one observed in an earlierstudy
by the authors for a number of advanced countries based on acentury of data.
The income velocity of money for a number of advanced countriesdisplays
a U shaped pattern over the past century,1 declining from the late nineteenth
century to between the first and second quarters of the twentiethcentury
when it begins a secular rise. This pattern can be clearlyseen in Figure 1
which shows the behavior of velocity for two advanced countries——theU.S.
and Sweden.
The central determinants of the decline in velocity stressed inthe
literature are permanent income (Friedman and Schwartz (1963)2 interestrates
(including the own rate of return on money), (Latane 1954, Klein 1973),monetization
and the spread of commercial banking (Tobin 1965) and improvedquality of
money (Klein 1977). The key determinants of its rise include: technological
improvements in the payments process (Fisher, 1911, Garvey, 1959 andGarvey
and Blyn 1970, Clower 1969, Townsend 1983) and the development ofmoney substitutes
(Gurley and Shaw 1961). No single theory can explain both the secular decline
and rise of velocity.2
In our previous work, Jonung (1978), Bordo and Jonung (1981) Jonung
(1983), Bordo and Jonung (1987) building on the work of Knut Wicksell (1934,
1936), we explain the secular behavior of velocity by stressing the influence
of institutional factors. According to our approach, the downward trend
in velocity is due to a process of monetization. This process encompasses
two interrelated forces, (a) the spread of the money economy, and (b) the
spread of commercial banking. The upward trend is explained by financial
sophistication and improved economic security and stability. By financial
sophistication is meant both the emergence of money substitutes and the development
of methods of economizing on cash balances. The rubric of improved economic
security and stability encompasses many aspects of the modern welfare state
as well as stabilization policies.
According to our approach, velocity is influenced by both sets of institutional
variables at the same time, but the monetization effect will first dominate
causing velocity to fall. Later the influence of financial development and
improved stability will be stronger than the monetization process causing
velocity to rise. The relative strength of these two sets of forces will
determine the dating of the turning point of velocity. Finally, these institutional
factors should be regarded as additional explanatory variables to the standard
determinants of velocity——real income or a measure of wealth and interest
rates. We thus view our approach as complementary to the traditional approach
stressing developments usually ignored in money demand studies.
In our previous work, Bordo and Jonung (1981) and Bordo and Jonung (1987)
Ch. 4, we tested our approach to the long—run behavior of velocity using3
annual data for approximately one hundred years for five countries: the
United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Norway. For eachcountry
we develop empirical counterparts for the institutional variables discussed
above. We then add these variables to a standard regression ofvelocity
on interest rates and permanent income.
Our results show that inclusion of the institutional variablessignificantly
improve a benchmark regression of velocity on permanent income, interest
rates and cycle variable for every country.In addition, in the majority
of cases the institutional variables are of the correct sign and significant
with the sole exception of our measure of economic security and stability.
Finally, we found that introduction of institutional variables lowers the
permanent income elasticity of the demand for money for each of the five
countries. We conclude that the use of permanent income in earlier studies
masks the influence of the institutional factors that have not been explicitly
dealt with in earlier studies.
In this paper we provide additional evidence for our approach by investigating
the global behavior of velocity in the post-World War II period since statistics
are available for this period or parts of it for practically all countries
in the world with the exception of the East European economies.
Our explanation suggests that the income velocity of money should behave
differently across countries depending on the stage of financial development.
Industrialized countries with well-developed financial systems should generally
display a rising trend in velocity while poor countries at an earlier stage
of economic growth should as a rule have falling trends. Velocity in economies4
"in between" should exhibit a fairly flat pattern with a weak positive or
negativetrend. Consequently testing this view, we should find a global
U-shaped velocity curve where the falling section represents financially
less developed economies, the turnaround section middle-income economies
and the rising section rich, highly industralized countries.
Section 2 discusses the data used. Section 3 discusses the patterns
expected. Section 4 constructs the U shaped global velocity curve. Section 5
presents an alternative piece of evidence for the global velocity curve based
on a pooled cross section time series regression. Section 6 makes comparisons
of our study with other studies. Finally Section 7 is a brief conclusion.
2.The Data
To construct a global velocity curve we use data for more than 80 countries
from the early 1950's to the early 1980's. We are well aware that such data
may in many cases be of dubious quality, however, no reason exists for a
systematic bias in the data.
The International Financial Statistics is used to calculate two measures
of velocity, one far a narrow measure of money (Vi) and one for a broad measure
(quasi—money)(V2). In order to limit the number of countries studied, all
countries with a population of less than 2.5 million inhabitants in 1975
have been excluded. Likewise, countries for which less than nine consecutive
observations of velocity exist are not included in the sample. Following
these guidelines, the behavior of velocity, both Vl and V2, in a total of
84 countries is examined.5
3. Patterns Expected
The institutional approach suggests that this cross-section data base
should give rise to a U-shaped pattern when countries are ordered by stages
of economic and financial development. An early stage would represent the
monetization process and the rise of the monetary economy at the expense
of barter. A later stage would stand for financial sophistication whenmoney
substitutes are developed and economic stability is improved.
It is difficult to construct a few simple measures of these developments
for all countries studied. For this reason we have chosen real per capita
income as a proxy measure of the stage of financial development.
We adopt the grouping of the world economies suggested by the World
Bank in the World Development Report 1983. The following four major groups
of countries are isolated in this report: (1) industrial market economies
with an average GNP per capita of $11,120 in 1981.(2) upper middle—income
economies with an average GNP per capita of $2,490 in 1981, (3) lower middle—income
economies with an average GNP per capita of $850, and (4) low-income economies.
The individual countries included in these four groups are displayed in Table 1.
As seen from the table the four groups are of roughly equal size. There
are 19 industrialized countries, 19 upper middle-income economies, 27 lower
middle-income and 19 low-income countries, altogether 84 countries.
The World Bank grouping also includes two other groups: East European
nonmarket economies (eight countries) and high-income oil exporters (four
countries). These are excluded as separate entities as no velocity series
are available from the East European countries (except for Rumania for a6
very short period). Of the oil exporting countries only Libya and Saudi
Arabia fulfill the restrictions placed on the selection of countries. These
two economies are placed among upper middle-income countries.
We would expect to find for the countries in Table 1 a picture similar
to that shown in Chart 2. This chart gives a schematic picture of the behavior
of velocity for the narrow and the broad definition of the money stock suggested
by our approach and our previous research using longitudinal data. Both
Vi and V2 displays a U—shaped pattern, but the VI curve has an earlier turning
point than the V2 curve. This reflects substitution of interest-bearing
time deposits for demand deposits with financial development. We thus have
three phases in the stylized chart; the first phase when both Vi and V2 decline,
the second phase when Vi rises while V2 continues to fall and finally, the
third phase, when both velocity curves rise.
4. The Global Velocity Curve
The secular picture is examined using simple regression estimates of
the following form:
(1) V =a+bt,where t stands for time.
Velocity is thus regressed on time as the independent variable. We
expect b (the time trend of velocity) to be negative for low-income countries
and positive for high-income countries and to be close to zero and/or at
least of smaller absolute magnitude for middle—income than for the richest
and poorest economies. We also expect the b coefficient to be different
for Vi and V2 as shown in Chart 2.7
Table 2 shows regressions for the four country groupings mentioned above
as well as several other groupings to be discussed below.3The aggregate
velocity curve is calculated as the average of individual country velocity
curves.4 The coefficient b for Vi is positive for the rich and theupper
middle-income economies and negative for the poor economies and the lower
middle-income countries -aresult consistent with our approach. The regressions
for V2 reveal that the b coefficient is negative for all groups of countries.
The coefficient becomes gradually smaller in absolute value as real income
increases.
A comparison with the stylized curves in Chart 2, suggest that the Vi
and V2 curves have passed through the first and second phase but not fully
reached the third phase, when both curves display an upward trend.
The trends calculated in Table 2 for the four country groups are displayed
in Charts 3—6 together with the actual behavior of velocity. These charts
reveal that a linear trend follows actual velocity fairly closely. Experiments
with non—linear trends did not offer any advantages. The velocity curve
for the poor countries in Chart 6 does not start until 1957 as most poor
countries did not achieve nation status until the 1960's.
A comparison with the stylized curves in Chart 1, suggests that the
Vi and V2 curves have passed through the first and second phase but not fully
reached the third phase, when both curves display an upward trend.
The four charts 3-6 are then combined, using a common scale for velocity,
into one in Chart 7 to construct the global curve. Table 3 classifies all
countries used to construct the global curve by phases of secular velocitybehavior. According to our hypothesis, as illustrated in chart 2, Vi and
V2 should each pass through three phases: the first phase when both Vi and
V2 are falling; the second phase when Vi is rising while V2 continues to
fall; and finally, the third phase, when both velocity curves are rising.
In Table 3, the 84 countries in our sample are grouped into three phases
based on the signs of the regression coefficient b of equation (1) calculated
in Appendix 1.In accordance with our hypothesis low income and lower middle
income countries dominate the first phase, middle income countries dominate
the second phase and rich countries dominate the thi.rd phase.
As can be clearly seen in Chart 7 the Vi curve has a U shaped pattern.
The velocity curve for the broader money stock measure, however, continues
to be downward sloping for all four groups of economies, albeit at a "slower"
rate. Chart 7 also shows that the level of the velocity curves for the rich
and the upper middle-income groups is lower than for the two other groups.
Two groups of countries did not fit into our classification scheme by
levels of per capita income: within the rich country group--Germany, Italy
and Japan; within the upper middle income country group--five high inflation
countries.5
First, within the group of rich economies underlying Chart 3, all except
Germany, Italy and Japan display falling trends in Vi. The common trend
behavior for these three countries are estimated in equation 5 in Table 2.
This pattern is also shown by the common velocity curves calculated for these
three countries in Chart 8.
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We do not have a simple explanation of this trend for Germany, Italy
and Japan. One explanation (or part of it) would emphasize the financial
effects of World War II on these countries being "losers". The War could
have temporarily set the financial system "backwards" compared to the rest
of the rich countries, e.g. the destruction of the national currencies and/or
national debt in each of these countries, the decartelization of the banking
system in Germany and Japan. Thus, we would expect velocity to start rising
in the future following the standard pattern of the rich countries. Also,
the commercial banking system in these three countries has played a more
important role in financing industry and government than in many other countries.
Thus, the supply of money substitutes in the form of bonds and stocks has
been comparatively less in these countries. This would help to explain why
velocity has not exhibited the rising trend of other advanced countries.
However, the velocity curve (Vi) in Germany is almost horizontal while V2
falls which may indicate that Vi will start rising in the near future in
that country.
Separating Germany, Italy and Japan from the rest of the set of rich
industrialized economies gives rise to a more pronounced upward trend in
Vi and a flat V2 curve, thus moving this group of countries closer to the
third phase of Chart 2.See also regression (5) in Table 2.
Second within the upper middle income group, five countries: Israel;
Uruguay; Chile; Argentina and Brazil; had positive trends greatly in excess
of the average value for the group as can be seen from regression (2) in
Table 2.10
The annual average growth rates of Vi are 5.3, 2.0, 5.7, 6.7, and 3.5
percent, respectively, compared to an average of 1.0 per cent for the whole
group in Table 2.
The strong positive trend of Vi for these five countries is most likely
due to their extremely high and rising rates of inflation. The rate of inflation
should properly be regarded as an opportunity cost of holding money. As
it rises, the public reduces its holding of money —inparticular currency
and non—interest bearing deposits -whichdominate the narrow money stock
definition underlying the Vi concept.6
To highlight the role of high and rising inflation rates, countries
with average inflation rates above 20 per cent per year for the period are
singled out into one group consisting of the five above-mentioned countries;
Israel, Uruguay, Chile, Argentina and Brazil.7 The average velocity curve
as well as its time trend is calculated for them. See regression (7) in
Table 2 and Chart 9. This chart shows that Vi has a sharp upward trend;
Vi rises for the group from a level of 4 to a level of 13 from 1952 to 1982.
V2, however, remains fairly flat. This result likely reflects interest payments
on time deposits that partially compensate for high rates of inflation raising
the demand for interest bearing time deposits relative to noninterest bearing
demand deposits. Chart 10 displays the global velocity curve excluding the
high inflation economies. This gives rise to a sharp difference in the behavior
of Vi for the middle income economies seen in Chart 3. Excluding high inflation
countries, the trend of Vl falls instead of rises. The trend of V2, however,
is not greatly affected. Thus the turnaround point of the global Vi curve11
is "pushed fOrward" to occur "between" upper middle—income and rich industrialized
economies. Judging from Chart 9, the velocity curves of lower middle-income
and upper middle—income countries are now quite similar.
5. Pooled Regression Results
An alternative piece of evidence for the U shaped global velocity curve
is to run a pooled cross section time series regression. Since we do not
have consistent measures of the institutional variables used in our earlier
studies for all the countries examined here we adopt real per capita income
as a very rough measure of financial development. We run the regression
of the form shown in Equation (2). This equation is expressed as a quadratic
function to capture the postulated U-shaped velocity curve. A log-linear
form is adopted to avoid problems of heteroscedasticity.
(2) N I N I N I
ZElogVj = Eboit+Z bijt lOg(Y/N)f
t=l i=l t=l i=l t=l i=1
N .1 N I
+ EE b2jt(log(Y/N))2+ EE b3itPit
t=l i=l t=l i=1
I N I
+ + ZZUjt i=l t=l i=l
t=l, ...N, i =1 ...I
where log stands for the natural logarithm, V.j is velocity for country i
in year t, (Y/N)jt is per capita real income for country i in year t measured
in U. S. dollars, P is the rate of inaltion for country i in year t defined12
as the first difference of the log of the price level.Di is a one-zero
durny for country i. According to our hypothesis, for both Vi andV2, b1
should be negative, b2 and b3 positive. Furthermore,our hypothesis postulates
that b1 should be largerin absolute value for V2 than forVi.
Regressions of equations (2) over the period 1952-82 for 74 countries
for which a complete data set exists arepresented in Table 4•8 Results
for both Vi and V2 are included. Results are shownusing OLS and to account
for the presence of severe autocorrelation, adjusted withthe Cochrane Orcutt
procedure.
The results for both vi and V2 using OLS conform to thepredictions
of our hypothesis. All three independent variables havethe postulated signs
and are statistically significant. When the dataare corrected for the severe
autocorrelation observed using OLS, our hypothesis is also well confirmed
for both Vi and V2. Finally, the larger (in absolutevalue) coefficient
of per capita income in the V2 than in the Vlregressions (using OLS) conforms
with our hypothetical description of the twocurves in Chart 2 that V2 should
decline more than Vi through much of therange.
The presence of severe autocorrelation in the OLSregression may reflect
the omission of important explanatory variables. This would not besurprising
since we use per capita income as a measure of all the differentaspects
of financial development. The Cochrane—Orcutt adjustment does notaccount
for such an omission.Consequently, we regard the evidence from the charts
as more informative than the regressions for the presence of a globalvelocity
curve.9' 1013
6. Comparisons with Other Studies
Several other cross-country studies of velocity behavior have usedIFS-data,
see e.g. Ezekiel and Adekunle (1964) Melitz and Corea (1970), Driscoll and
Lahiri (1982) and Townsend (1983). However, to our knowledgeno study uses
such a long time period or as a complete a sample as we do here. Adekunle
and Ezekiel examined 37 countries for the period 1950-64, Meiitiz and Corea
examined 17 countries for the period 1952-1967 and Driscoll and Lahiri (1982)
studied 12 countries for the period 1952—1967.
The results of each of these studies are consistent with our approach
in a number of respects. Adenkunle and Ezekiel found for their sample of
countries that both Vi and V2 generally declined with the level ofper capita
income, however, they detected some evidence for rising V at very high levels
of economic development.
Melitz and Corea demonstrated that the pattern of velocity across countries
is closely related to the level of per capita income, following a U shaped
pattern. Driscoll and Lahiri showed that the relative size of the agricultural
sector is positively related to velocity across countries, consistent with
the results in Bordo and Jonung (1981). Finally, Townsend (1983), using
Raymond Goldsmith's data (1982) showed that the pattern of velocity across
countries is positively related to the ratio of private credit to GNP, where
GNP is a proxy measure of financial development; a result also consistent
with our approach.11
7. Conclusion
Our approach suggests that velocity should be falling at the early stages
of economic development and rising at later stages. Using a world-wide sampleof 84 countries for the period 1952-1982, we find strong support for our
explanation. We believe that we are able to detect a global U-shaped velocity
curve similar to the long run velocity curves found in our earlier work.
Thus we regard the empirical evidence presented here -basedon a data set
and on test procedures complementary to our long—run time series evidence
as additional evidence in favor of our institutional explanation.15
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1Bordo andJonung (1987) shows such a pattern for the United States,
Canada, United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Holland, France
and Australia. Also see Capie and Wood (1986), Saint Marc (1984) and the
literature surveyed in Bordo (1986).
2Friedman and Schwartz'sexplanation for the observed decline in velocity
(V2) in the U. S. from 1867 to just after World War 11, based on Friedman's
(1959) estimate of the permanent income elasticity of the demand for real
cash balances of 1.8, was that money can be regarded as a luxurygood. Subsequently,
Friedman and Schwartz (1982) also regard the secular fall in velocityas
due to growing financial sophistication.
3Appendix 1 shows calculations ofvelocity trends for each of the 84
countries and Appendix 2 shows the individual velocity curves.
4For the calculationprocedure see the Notes to Table 2.
5Within theupper middle income group, excluding high inflation countries,
Vi rises only in Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Portugal, Malaysia and Iraq.
V2 falls or is flat for all countries.16
In the lower middle income group, Vi has an upward trend in three out
of 27 economies (Dominican Republic, Philippines and Thailand), a flat trend
in 9 cases and a downward trend in the remaining countries. V2 is flat or
falling in all cases.
Finally in the low income Group, Vi as well as V2 falls fairly sharply
in a large number of countries, in particular in African states such as logo,
Sudan, Tanzania, Upper Volta and Ethiopia. Only two countries actually display
an upward trend in Vi, namely Sri Lanka and India. All other countries have
a downward or flat trend in both Vi and V2.
6Laidler (1985) summarizes evidence formoney demand studies for high
inflation countries. These studies show a strong influence from inflation
(expected inflation) upon the demand for money and thus on velocity in a
manner shown by Chart 9 and Table 2.
7An inspection of the velocitycurves of individual countries in Appendix
2 reveals that periods of high and rising inflation rates tend to be associated
with rising velocity (Vi).
8The countries omitted from theoriginal sample of 84 due to lack of
data are: Algeria, Argentina, Ivory Coast, Nicaragua, Senegal, Togo, Sudan,
Madagascar, Upper Volta and Burundi.
9The inclusion of separate dummy variables for eachyear to capture
time specific shifts in addition to the country dummies in the global velocity
curve produced results almost identical to these of Table 4 as did those
in regressions including a time trend as a separate independent variable.17
10Converting per capita income for eachcountry into U. S. dollars using
official exchange rates from the IFS data, as we did,may induce considerable
bias. Such a conversion assumes that the basket of goods consumed in each
country is identical to that of the U. S. Less developed countries tend
to consume a basket of goods more heavily weighted towards nontraded services
than do advanced countries. Thus converting per capita income of the less
developed country into the currency units of a more advanced country will
bias its measured income downwards. See Belassa (1964). The use ofpurchasing
power adjusted exchange rates as in Kravis, Heston and Summers (1978), may
help solve this problem. Considering the crude character of our proxy variable
for financial development in equation (2), i.e., real per capita income,
we did not attempt this procedure.
Other studiesexamining velocity across countries include Doblin (1951),
Fleetwood-Jucker (1958), Kaufman and Latta (1966) and Penman (1970).18
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The Income Velocity of Money of Industrial Market Economies.
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:otes:See Table1 for the countriesc:vered.
SeeTable2 for the trend of velocity.Chart 4
The Income Velocity of Money of Upper Middle-Income Economies.























1 980 1964 1968 1972 1976
1 for the countries c:;ered.
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TheIncome Velocity of Money of Lower Middle-Income Economies.
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The Income Velocity of Money of Low-Income Economies.
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The Global Velocity Curve (86 countries).
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The Income Velocity of Money of Germany, Italy and Japan.

























Nctes: See Table.2 for the trend of veicity.Chart 9
The Income Velocity of Money of High Inflation Economies
(Israel, Uruguay, Chile, Argentina and Brazil).
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The Global Velocity Curve excluding High Inflation Economies
(i.e. Israel, Uruguay, Chile, Argentina and Brazil).
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1 960Table1. Country Groupings by Levels of Economic Development
(Within each group countries are ranked according to
real per capita income in 1981 U.S. dollars starting
with the country with the highest income.)
Group Countries
Industrial market Switzerland, Sweden1 Norway, Germany, Denmark,
(rich) economies United States, France, Belgium, Netherlands,
($11,120/p.c.) Canada, Australia, Finland, Austria, Japan,
United Kingdom, New Zealand, Italy, Spain and Ireland.
Upper middle- Saudi Arabia, Libya, Singapore, Israel, Greece,
income economies Venezuela, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, South Africa,
($2,490/p.c.) Chile, Argentina, Portugal, Mexico, Brazil,
Algeria, Malaysia, Iraq, Iran and Korea.
Lower middle- Paraguay, Jordan, Syrian Arab Rep., Turkey, Costa
income economies Rica, Tunisia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ivory
($850/p.c.) Coast, Jamaica, Ecuador, Peru, Guatemala, Nigeria,
Nicaragua, Morocco, Philippines, Thailand, El
Salvador, Egypt, Zambia, Honduras, Bolivia,
Indonesia, Yemen Arab Rep., Senegal and Kenya.
Low-income Ghana, Togo, Sudan, Pakistan, Madagascar, Sierra
economies Leone, Sri Lanka, Haiti, Tar.zania, India, Upper
($270/p.c.) Volta, Burundi, Uganda, Zaire, Malawi, Burma, Nepal,
Ethiopia and Bangladesh.
Source: Table 1 in World Development Report 1983, Washington 1983
Notes: Countries are excluded if their pculaticn was under 2.5
million in 1975 arid if they lacked ata or1 velocity for
for 9 years or more.
Saudi Arabia and Libya are include ancng upper middle-
income economies although they are nc1uded amcr1g high-
income oil cxporters in the ?orld :ecpnent Reocrt.
The CNPpercapita estimates refer o all countries within
eachgroup, respectively. They are not representative for the
countries shown inthe table as lack of datareduces the
selection ofccr.omies.However, theCN?per capita
estimatesgive a rough indication of the global spread
of incomes.Table2. Velocity Behavior for Country Groupings. Regression equation
V =a+btwhere t stands for time. t-statistics in
parentheses.
Country Group PeriodRegression estimates Growth of
Velocity
b D.W.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
I. Industrial market Vi: 1952-82 .067 (21.7) .940 .871 1.4
(rich) economies V2: 1952-82 -.009 (—13.2).853 1.305 -0.5
2. Upper middle- Vi: 1953-82 .068 (6.4) .575 .487 0.8
income economies V2: 1953-82 —.068 (—16.1).900 .894 -2.6
3. Lower middle— Vi: 1952-83 —.034 (—5.2) .462 .863 0.0
income economies V2: 1952—83 —.118 (—26.0).957 1.270 —2.2
4. Low—income Vi: 1962—82 -.125 (—10.2) .840 1.091 —1.6
economies V2: 1962-82 —.176 (—21.8).960 1.178 3.3
5. Germany, Italy,Vi: 1952-82 -.031 (-10.9).797 1.100 -0.6
Japan V2: 1952—82 —.040 (—12.9).847 .328 —2.6
6. Industrial Vi: 1952—82 .086 (26.2) .958 .854 1.7
market economies V2: 1952-82 -.004 (-4.0) .341 .857 -0.2
exci. Group 5
7. High inflation Vi: 1952-82 .273 (10.2) .774 .317 3.8
countries V2: 1952-82 .032 (3.7) .301 .740 0.2
8. Upper middle— Vi: 1953-81 —.022 (—4.6) .413 1.146 —0.5
income exci.. V2: 1953-81 —.104 (-20.2).936 .760 —3.2
Group 7
Notes: The group specific velocity curveused for calculating the table
is derived in the following way. Themeanlevel of velocity within each
country group is calculated for the first yea: fcr a base year which is
the maximum number of obzervaticns (count:es) is available. For the
other years the arithmetic means of the annual first differencesare
calculated.Going forward from the base year, these values are
successively added to the mean level as calculated above. Going backward
from the base year, the vaues are successively subtracted. ifl this
manner, we construct the common velocity curve for the whole period. The
procedure is halted when more than one thi:d of the maximum number of
countries have dropped out of the sample. (This occurs in 1962 for the
low-incomecountries).Table 3. Countriesgrouped by Phases of Secular Behavior of
Velocity.
During phase I the income velocity ofMi(Vi)
as well as of M2(V2 displays a negative secular trend,
during phase II Vi is rising while V2 is falling. During
phase III both Vi and V2 are rising -seeChart 6:1.
Phases Group of Countries
countries
(1) (2) (3)
Phase I: Rich countries: Germany, Japan, Italy.
(Both Vi and Upper middle-income: Libya, Singapore Greece,
V2 falling) Venezuela, Yugoslavia,
Algeria, Iran Korea.
Lower middle-income: Paraguay, Joran, Syria,













Phase II: Rich countries: Norway France1
(Vi rising and N'theriands, Finland,
V2 falling) Sj:ain.








Low-income: Sr Lanka, India, Zaire,
MaLawi.
Phase III: Rich countries: Swtze:land, Sweden,
(Both 71 and Dcr.nark, UE.A, elgaun,
V2 rising) Canada, Australia, Austria
Un:tedKingdcn,New
Ze1and, Ireland.




£ou:ces SeeTable1 for the groupingofcountries accordin to per
capItair.ccre.
Nctes:The classification of individual count::es into rhases :s
based onthesign of the regression cceffcienn b in Tals 6.2.
Fcc a fo countries the velocity curve, either 71 or V2,has been horizontal.In these border cases the sign of uhe regression
coeffacient has deternined the groupang of phase, although the














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Global Trend Behavior of Velocity, 84 countries.
Regression equation V =a+btwhere t stands for time,t =0for
1950. Annual growth in velocity (column (6)) is calculated as the
compounded growth rate. t-statistics in parenthesis.
Country Period Regression estimates Growth of
(GNP/p.c. b R2 D.W. V
1981 $)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. SWITZERLAND
($17,340) Vi: 1952-82 .026 (7.22) .643 .920 1.5
V2: —- .001( .42) .006 .810 —.2
2. SWEDEN
($14,870) Vi: 1952—82 .068 (8.13) .695 .869 .1
V2: _N_ .004 (2.42) .168 1.000 —.2
3. NORWAY
($14,060) Vi: 1952—82 .060 (7.33) .650 .455 1.8
'12: _N_ -.001 (.43) .006 .432 .3
4. GERMANY
($13,450) V1: 1952—82 —.005 (—.94).030 1.680 —.2
V2:-- -.052(—12.21) .837 .322 -2.7
5. DENMARK
($13,120) Vi: 1952—82 .024 (6.04) .557 1.187 .5
V2: -'- .009 (6.16) .566 1.151 .4
6.USA
($12,820) V1: 1952—82 .126 (29.24) .967 .339 2.9
V2: -"— .024(12.03) .817.808 1.0
7. FRANCE
($12,190) Vi: 1952-82 .028 (4.36) .413 .301 .6
V2:-- —.047(—14.87) .391 .593 -1.8
8.BELGIUM
($1,920) Vi: 1952—82 .074 (17.00).909 .435 2.2V2:-— .001(1.00) .033 1.323 0.1
9. NETHERLANDS
($11,790) Vi: 1952—82.073 (19.40) .929 1.595 1.9
V2: —'— -.019(-9.24).746 .641 -.8
10. CANADA
($11,400) Vi: 1952—82 .082 (4.18) .376 .346 1.8
V2: -— .030(—9.80).768 .562 -1.1
ii. AUSTRALIA
($11.080) Vi: 1952—82.188 (35.23) .977 1.543 3.9
V2:—— .025(17.50) .913 .946 1.6
12. FINLAND
($10,680) Vi: 1952—82 .100 (5.33) .495 .655 .7
V2:_R_-.013(—4.93) .456 .705 -1.1
13. AUSTRIA
($10,210) Vi: 1952—82 .076 (9.34) .757 .897 1.5
V2: —— -.062(—19.30) .930 .495 —3.3
14. JAPAN
($10,080) Vi: 1952—82 —.026 (—541) .510 .768
V2; -'- -.020(—9.88).777 1.569 -1.8
15. UNITED KINGDOM
($9,110) Vi:i952—82 .135 (31.17).971 1.709 2.9
V2: —'— .023(4.59) .421 .424 1.0
16. NEWZEALAND
($7,700) Vi: 1952—82 .209 (18.54).925 .593 3.9
V2: -"— .044(3.95) .358 .227 1.5
17. ITALY
($6,960) Vi: 1952—82.064 (—12.27) .843 .259 -1.5
V2: —"— -.041(—13.99) .875 .229 -2.1
18. SPAIN
($5,640) Vi: 1952—82 .016 (3.79) .347 .384 .6
V2: —'- -.029(-12.66) .856 .298 -1.19. IRELAND
($5,230) Vi: 1952—82 .080 (7.89) .682 .247 1.9
V2: .013(8.46) .711 .896 0.7
20. SAUDI ARABIA
($12,600) Vi: 1952—82 .058 (.88) .043 1.195 .9
V2: _l_ .022 (.46) .012 1.099 —.4
21. LIBYA
($8,450) Vi: 1960—78 —.206 (—5.20) .614 .572 -3.2
V2: _N_ -.164 (—5.66) .653 .572 -3.5
22. SINGAPORE
($5,240) Vi: 1968-81 —.007 (—.45) .016 1.694 —0.1
V2: _N_ -.010 (—1.60).175 .844 -1.3
23. ISRAEL
($5,160) Vi: 1952—82 .311 (5.16) .478 .161 5.3
V2: _N_ -.108 (23.94).952 .691 —4.0
24. GREECE
($4,420) Vi: 1952—82 —.145 (—7.11) .643 .160 —2.4
V2:"— —.174 (—8.83).736 .121 5.9
25. VENEZUELA
($4,220) Vi: 1952—82 —.057 (—3.16).256 .369 —.9
V2: —.091 (—9.64).762 .670 -2.7
26. URUGUAY
($2,820) Vi: 1955—82 .194 (7.36) .676 1.147 2.0
V2: -'- -.000 (-.01) .000 .470 -3.2
27. YUGOSLAVIA
($2,790) Vi: 1960—81 —.001 (—0.5) .000 .494 .3
V2:-- -.033(—7.59).743 1.148 -1.9
28. SOUTH AFRICA
($2,770) Vi: 1952—82 .110 (11.85).829 .528 2.0
V2: -'- -.015(—4.37).397 .622 -.129. CHILE
($2,560) Vi: 1964—82 .496 (3.95) .479 .702 5.7
V2:—— —.067(-1.09).065 .782 —.8
30. ARGENTINA
($2,560) Vi: 1965—81 .366 (3.59) .518 1.016 6.7
V2: —'— -.023(—.68) .037 1.664 —.9
31. PORTUGAL
($2,520) Vi: 1952—80 .021 (5.45) .534 .554 1.1
V2: 1953—80.024 (—11.66) .840 .406 -1.7
32. MEXICO
(2,250) Vi: 1952—81 .014 (1.50) .075 .849 .4
V2: 1952—81 -.090 (—4.87).459 .325 —2.7
33. BRAZIL
($2,220) Vi: 1952—81.181 (10.27) .790 .442 3.5
V2: .153 (12.37) .845 .772 3.4
34. ALGERIA
($2,140) Vi: 1964—81 —.057 (—3.89) .486 .472 —2.6
V2: —.060(—4.02) .503 .415 —3.1
35. 4ALAYSIA
($1,840) Vi: 1955—82 .020 (1.33) .064 .422 0.8
V2:———.073(—8.38).730 .385 -2.4
36. IRAQ
(n.a.) Vi: 1953—76 .033 (2.15).173 1.242 .5
V2:———.008(—.69) .021 1.119
37. IRAN
(n.a.) Vi: 1959—80 —.092 (-2.09).195 .847 —4.4
V2:—— —.151(—7.71).768 .830 -6.1
38. KOREA
($1,700) Vi: 1953—82 —.159 (.4.53).423 .869 —2.3
V2: -"— —.366(11.37).822 .636 -6.039. PARAGUAY
($1,630) Vi: 1952—82 —.018 (—.60) .012 .695 1.6
V2:—— —.217(—8.35).706 .415 —1.5
40. JORDAN
($1,620) Vi: 1959—82 —.106 (—5.81).605 .341 —2.7
V2:——-.104(-8.95).784 .372 -4.5
41. SYRIAN A.R.
($1,570) Vi: 1963—81 —.086 (—10.10) .857 1.497 -2.3
V2: -.086(-11.43) .885 1.640 -2.5
42. TURKEY
($1,540) Vi: 1952—82 .013 (.92) .028 .336 .5
V2: —.035(—3.70).321 .595 -1.4
43. COSTA RICA
($1,430) Vi: 1952—80 —.034 (—3.93).364 1.263 —0.3
V2:-— -.104(—10.29) .797 .628 -2.9
44. TUNISIA
($1,420) Vi: 1960—78 —.001 (—.12) .0011.683 —.4
V2:—— —.057(—9.41).839 .973 —2.5
45. COLOMBIA
($1,380) Vi: 1952—81 .009 (.77) .021 .414 .3
V2:—— —.026(—3.60).316 1.225 -1.1
46. DOMINICAN REP.
($1,260) Vi: 1952—80 .084 (4.80) .4611.767 1.1
V2: —"— —.064(—3.85).354 1.246
47. IVORY COST
($1.200) Vi: 1962—78 —.111 (—12.40) .911 1.362 -1.8
V2:—- -. 147(-19.80) .963 2.025 -3.4
48. JAMAICA
($1,180) Vi: 1953-82 -.082(-4.73).450 1.041-0.7
V2: -"- -.089(1Q.11) .785 .772 -2.849. ECUADOR
($1,180) Vi: 1952—82.133 (—14.87) .884 .824 —1.5
V2: - -.105(—14.35) .876 .647 —1.8
50. PERU
($1,170) Vi: 1952—82 —.064 (—2.78).210 .328 .6
V2: —U— —.027 (—4.49) .411 .821 —.9
51. GUATEMALA
($1,140) Vi: 1952—81 .015 (.97) .033 .802 .1
V2: _U_ -.181 (—16.30) .905 .605 —2.7
52. NIGERIA
($870) Vi: 1952—81 —.110 (—3.73).332 .431 —2.1
V2:——-.167(—11.18) .817 .775 3.4
53. NICARAGUA
($860) Vi: 1960—78 .004 (.11) .001 .925 .2
V2:—— —.157(—5.48).639 .859 -2.1
54. MOROCCO
($860) Vi: 1958—82 —.039 (—8.74).769 .795 —1.2
V2: —— —.049(—9.54).799 .551 -i.8
55. PHILIPPINES
($790) Vi: 1952—82 .171 (11.06).808 .786 2.2
V2: _U_ —.030 (—3.00).237 .428 -1.1
56. THAILAND
($70) Vi: 1952—82 .151 (11.50).820 .424 1.8
V2: —a- —.102(—24.79) .955 .529 -3.0
57. EL SALVADOR
($650) Vi: 1952—82 —.014 (—.75) .019 .301 -0.5
V2: —"— —.111 (—21.83) .943 .951 -2.7
58. EGYPT
($650) Vi: 1952—82 .004 (.65) M14 .615 .5
V2: -"- —.027(-4.55).417 .327 1.759. ZAMBIA
($600) Vi: 1965—82 —.156 (—5.10).619 1.623 —3.5
V2:-— —.158(—6.60).731 .945 -5.3
60. HONDURAS
($600) Vi: 1952—82 —.068 (—3.63).312 .531 —.7
V2:——-.166(—12.56) .845 .552 -2.7
61. BOLIVIA
($600) Vi: 1952—79) —.365 (—3.96) .376 .707 —1.2
V2: _N_ —.461(—5.61).548 .809 —2.6
62. INDONESIA
($530) Vi: 1965—82 —.411 (—4.15) .519 .804 —.6
V2:——-.562N5.37) .643 .772 3.6
63. YEMEN A.R.
($460) Vi: 1973—82 —.250 (—2.89).510 .514 —8.6
V2: —— -.211(—2.93).518 .508 -8.8
64. SENEGAL
($430) Vi: 1962—81 —.141 (—3.39) .389 .355 —.7
V2:—— —.193(—4.58) .539 .321 -2.0
65. I<ENYA
($420) Vi: 1966—82 —.063 (—2.40).278 .749 —1.3
'/2:—— —.071(—5.04).629 .806 —2.1
66. GHANA
($400) Vi: 1955—78 —.083 (—3.87).405 .860 -1.1
'/2:-—-.115(—9.13).791 1.079 -1.6
67. TOGO
($380) Vi: 1962—81 —.312 (—11.56) .881 1.603 -5.3
'/2: -'— -.358(—16.27) .936 1.603 -6.5
68. SUDAN
($380) '/1: 1956—78 —.271 (—14.35) .907 .720 —3.6
'/2:---.289(—11.91) .871 .679 —4.269. PAKISTAN
($350) Vi: 1960—82 —.118 (—4.85).528 .774 —1.3
V2: _N_ —.119 (—6.83).690 .691 -2.4
70. MADAGASCAR
($330) Vi: 1962—79 —.052 (—3.20) .405 1.006 —1.5
V2:-— —.099(—8.80) .838 1.. 151 -2.7
71. SIERRA LEONE
($320) Vi: 1964—81 —.223 (—5.30).637 1.658 —1.0
V2: _U_ —.223 (—9.17).840 1.740 —2.7
72. SRI LANKA
($300) Vi: 1952—82 .087 (6.53) .595 .724 1.6
V2: .032 (—3.99) .354 .738 —1.2
73. HAITI
($300) Vi: 1966—82 —.447 (—8.60).831 1.472 -4.6
V2:—— —.502(—12.14) .908 .616 7.3
74. TANZANIA
($280) Vi: 1966—81 —.174 (—5.69) .698 1.101 —5.2
V2: —— —.164(—7.20) .787 .957 -5.9
75. INDIA
($260) Vi: 1952—81 .021 (2.94).236 1.245 .4
V2:. —— —.061(—7.84).687 .450 -2.2
76. UPPER VOLTA
($240) Vi: 1965—79 —.294 (—4.2) .598 1.148 —1.6
V2: —.382 (—5.83).739 1.060 —3.5
77. BURUNDI
($230) Vi: 1964—82 —.165 (—3.84) .464 1.678
V2:. _N_ —.167 (—4.18).507 1.743 -1.2
78. UGANDA
($220) Vi: 1966—78 —.001 (—.01) .000 .975 2.4
V2: .062(.90) .068 1.006 3.479. ZAIRE
($210) Vi: 1963—82 .025 (.72) .028 1.382 —.3.
V2:-- -.006(-.22) .003 1.221 —.9
80. MALAWI
($200) Vi: 1965—82 .046 (.90) .049 .612 .8
V2:—— —.124(-4.88).598 .676 -2.0
81. BURMA
($190) Vi: 1952—82 —.033 (—1.61) .082 .370 —1.8
V2:—— —.05.3(—3.07) .245 .396 -2.7
82. NEPAL
($150) Vi: 1958—82 —.652 (—6.96).678 .428 —5.1
V2: —i'- -.757(10.39).824 .417 -7.8
83. ETHIOPIA
($140) Vi: 1961—82 —.295 (—9.45) .817 .553 —3.8
V2: —"— -.280(—19.77) .951 .889 —4.5
84. BANGLADESH
($140) Vi: 1974—82 —.437 (—1.59).265 2.121 .3
V2: —- —.364(—2.56).483 2.315 —3.0—I
Appendix 2
Velocity curves of 84 countries
in the post World War IIperiod.
Vi-straight line
V2-dashed line
Source: See Table 1ISWITZERLAND
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